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1. 
The defendants' refusal to address the governing statutes 
and administrative rules doesn't avoid their application. 
Defendants/respondents got one thing mostly right in their brief: 
"[T]he Rammells have renewed the argument that they made below, which the 
District Court did not address. That argument is that Idaho's law, as written -
both its statutes and promulgated rules and regulations - simply did not allow 
the State to kill their escaped animals, either by the direct action of the State's 
agents, or by the State-authorized depredation hunt that took place under rules 
that were promulgated by the Idaho Department of Fish and Game; both being 
actions that were authorized [sic: "ordered"] by the Governor's September 7, 
2006, executive order (R., pp. 444-54)." 
Respondents' Brief at 16, emphasis added. Perhaps thinking if it worked for the lower court it 
might work here, defendants eschew any quotation or discussion whatsoever of the actual 
language of I.C. §25-3705A or, for that matter, any of the statutes or administrative rules that 
govern livestock generally or domestic elk in particular. 
Instead what we see from defendants on appeal is the mirror image of what transpired 
below: In the lower court, the State and its former governor simply placed their ipse dixit 
conclusion (,'We win") before the lower court, which agreed. Here, they simply place the lower 
court's ipse dixit conclusion ("Defendants win") before this Court in the hope it, too, will simply 
give them what they ask without addressing the reality that obtains in this case: 
A. The only provisions in the entire Idaho Code and Administrative Rules that authorize 
the actual destruction of domestic elk are those pertaining to animals that are actually found to 
be "infected, or affected with, or exposed to an animal health emergency disease" (IDAP A 
02.04.19.305.01). 
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B. There was never any such finding of disease or so much as a scintilla of evidence that 
would even suggest such a finding. 
C. Nobody but the lower court, in its gratuitous footnote 7 (R., p. 114), has ever so 
much as suggested that escaped livestock - whether domestic elk or otherwise - constitute any 
"public nuisance" and an entire chapter of the Idaho Code, Title 25, Chapter 23, makes it plain 
they do not. 
D. The only "authority" urged by the defendants or the court below for the intentional 
destruction of plaintiffs property was I.e. §25-3705A, the "seven day" provision of which is by 
its plain language for the protection of the ordinary licensed hunter who, while in compliance 
with all Fish and Game rules and regulations, takes an escaped domestic animal instead of a wild 
one. And finally, 
E. The only authority given by the legislature to the State pertaining to escaped 
domestic elk is the authority to capture them, and then only where the Administrator has made a 
fact-specific determination the owner has failed to do so in a "timely" (not "seven-day") manner. 
Then entry of summary judgment must be reversed. 
2. Red herrings. 
Struggling (and failing) to muster anything to even urge in any genuine defense of their 
summary judgment, defendants try the next best thing: They trumpet the fact plaintiff hasn't 
contested the obvious - and obviously immaterial - fact the statute as written is perfectly 
constitutional. First they quote the lower court's "finding" of that which was uncontested, 
whereupon they imply plaintiffs briefing has been done with invisible ink: 
* * * 
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"I fInd that because the legislature - legislative actions in passing 
2S-370SA and not - and in not providing compensation are 
constitutionally proper under the public nuisance doctrine. The 
statute itself is constitutional and it doesn't sound to me like the 
Rammells really argue that it's not constitutional. They just argue 
about what it means. 
MR. FUREY: That's correct. 
THE COURT: Okay. But I'm going to make a 
finding that it is constitutional. And therefore, the court is going 
to dismiss all cause of action based on any takings claims, which 
would be Counts One and Two. 
[December 16,2010, Tr., p. 48, L. 14 - p. 49, L. 2.] 
On this appeal, the Rammell Appellants have not directly challenged the 
District Court's decision and holding, as set out immediately above, that the 
State's actions did not constitute an unconstitutional taking of the Rammells' 
property without payment of just compensation, or the district court's fInding the 
'escape' of those animals from confInement itself was sufficient justifIcation for 
the State's actions." 
Respondents' Brief at IS - 16, emphasis added. And just before, they also declared the 
unremarkable reality of the statute's uncontested constitutionality as an "essential" fInding: 
"The essential fmdings of the district court in support of its grant of the State's 
summary judgment motion are set out as follows: 
The court finds that it [I.e. §2S-370SA] is constitutional, and 
therefore, the state did not violate the takings clause or due process 
clauses of either the state or the federal constitution or of the 
eminent domain clause of the state constitution." 
* * * 
Respondents' Brief at 14, emphasis added. 
Since neither the defendants nor the lower court ever did address the actual language of 
the statutes and rules here involved, their foregoing arguments will serve as well as any to 
illustrate just how far they had to stretch to reach the result they did in this case. The statutes 
and rules authorize only capture and fines for the "unduly lengthy" escape of domestic elk. 
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They don't authorize their destruction. The fact those statutes and rules are constitutional is as 
off-point and immaterial as would be some "finding" they were duly passed by a majority. The 
unchallenged constitutionality of I.e. § 25-3705A was the best defendants or the lower court 
could muster, however, so when plaintiffs counsel passed on the court's invitation to argue 
against its clear constitutionality, the court made its "finding" anyway - while pointedly ignoring 
"the argument [plaintiff) made below, which the District Court did not address." (See 
Respondents' Brief at 16.) It sure didn't, and that is no way for trial courts to decide cases. 
The same exposure lies with respect to the lower court's attachment of significance to the 
fact the "legislative action in passing 25-3705A and ... not providing compensation" is 
constitutional. Any reading of the statutory and regulatory schemes (attached to plaintiffs 
opening brief as an Appendix) discloses why the legislature, when enacting I.e. §25-3705A, 
didn't "provide for compensation": the statute doesn't authorize any taking or destruction of 
property to compensate for. Again, that is entirely constitutional and entirely beside the point. 
Finally, defendants seek shelter in the lower court's suggestions of "public nuisance" and 
"public necessity." As to the former, they offer the quote repeated above, i.e., " ... 
constitutionally proper under the public nuisance doctrine." As noted in plaintiffs opening brief, 
however, the suggestion of "public nuisance" finds no existence, support, justification or 
rationale anyplace in this entire case other than the lower court's gratuitous footnote 7 of its 
Order Re: Motion to Dismiss (R., 114) noting that such a doctrine does exist in the common law. 
Nothing about the existence of a doctrine, however, makes it applicable in a case absent some 
facts (and uncontroverted ones at that, if summary judgment is to be entered) that make it 
applicable, and there are no such facts anywhere in the record in this case. 
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With respect to the defendants' and the lower court's attempt to justify the defendants' 
acts by means of the "public necessity doctrine," they again offer nothing but ipse dixit - instead 
of any facts, let alone any uncontroverted ones - to support applicability of the doctrine. And in 
this the lower court actually ran headlong up against itself when it sought to justify imposition of 
an attorney fee award on a basis directly at odds with what it had said before on the exact same 
subject, albeit in a different context. Defendants quote the lower court as follows in their brief at 
28: 
"In this Court's Order regarding Defendants' Motion to Dismiss, dated April 29, 
2009, the Rammells were clearly and unequivocally advised that no reasonable 
basis in fact or law existed with respect to their claims against the State or the 
individual defendants. In fact, even as to the 'taking' claims against the State, the 
Court put them on notice that under the public necessity doctrine, it was unlikely 
that would survive." [June 3, 2011, Order Granting Costs and Fees in Part] (R., 
681-682). 
Emphasis added. A year and a half earlier, though, when the lower court on April 29, 2009, was 
granting most of the defendants' Motion to Dismiss (based in part on its baseless and gratuitous 
assertion the escaped livestock were "believed to be diseased"), it did at least acknowledge the 
language of I.e. §25-3705A and observed - correctly - that it did not serve as any codification 
of the public necessity doctrine: 
"Finally, even the language of LC. §25-3705A itself appears to indicate an 
intention to insulate licensed hunters, and the state agencies who licensed those 
hunters, from liability for inadvertently killing and taking domestic cervidae that 
have escaped for more than seven (7) days, not to serve as a codification of a 
version of the public necessity doctrine." 
(R., p. 114, emphasis added.) It is telling that the same lower court who wrote the above en 
route to disposing of most of plaintiffs case on its own assertion they were "believed to be 
diseased," would then - after the defendants reminded her they had intentionally, rather than 
inadvertently, destroyed plaintiffs valuable property (R. p. 230) and after plaintiffs had howled 
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about her "believed to be diseased" handout - state the following from the bench at the 
December 16, 2010, hearing: 
"I don't think it's ambiguous. I do agree with [plaintiffs] counsel, it's not 
ambiguous, but I think his interpretation is just flat wrong. 
And, like I said, it makes no sense that if it's just to preclude accidental taking, 
then you wouldn't need the seven days and you wouldn't need the proclamation. 
They would just have to be escaped. And they could say that. They could have 
easily said if there's an accidental taking by a licensed hunter who was in 
compliance with Title 36 of a domesticated - a domestic cervidae who has 
escaped regardless of how long it is, then that - they could certainly do that. 
That's not what they did." 
December 16,2010, Tr., p. 46, L. 18 - p. 47, L. 6. None of the purported bases defendants urge 
allowing the summary judgment to stand has merit, no matter how many different ones they try 
on. 
3. Defendants may now regret framing the issue the lower court accepted as 
violation of a "reasonable time," but that's how they framed it and trying to 
recant now doesn't avoid the applicable Rule's provision for 
"timely, as determined by the Administrator," anyway. 
Defendants are clearly struggling: On the one hand, they themselves framed the issue 
below as "the question that is now renewed on this motion for summary judgment is whether the 
[plaintiffs] can sustain their taking claims in the face of evidence l presented by the defendants 
that the [plaintiffs'] failure to recapture their escaped animals within a reasonable time created a 
public nuisance that the defendants were entitled to abate without the payment of any 
compensation to the [plaintiffs]." (R., p. 229.) Haunted now by the fact determinations of what 
is reasonable almost always present questions of fact which cannot properly be disposed of on 
summary judgment, defendants now insist: 
1 They never really say what evidence; it is hoped the Court will ask them at argument. 
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"The State has consistently taken the position in this case that the seven day 
period established in I.C. §25-3705A(3) and the administrative regulations 
adopted thereunder, is the reasonable period of time allowed for the recapture of 
escaped domestic elk before the State may act to take those animals without the 
payment of compensation to the owner." 
Respondents' brief at 19, emphasis added. So they have, but even if the Court accepts their 
invitation to pretend they didn't frame the issue the way they did (and the way the lower court 
apparently accepted, since it gave them what they asked for), they still must lose. Section 25-
3 705A(3), as explained almost ad nauseum in this case, has nothing to do with authorizing the 
State to sally forth and summarily and intentionally destroy a rancher's livestock simply for 
being "out." Administrative Rule 204.05, on the other hand, specifically covers the exact 
situation presented by a too-long-running escape of domestic elk. It provides that if the 
Administrator determines the rancher has been unable to get his stock back in in a "timely" 
manner, then the State can capture - not slaughter - them: 
Capture. In the event that the owner or operator of a domestic cervidae ranch is 
unable to retrieve escaped domestic cervidae in a timely manner, as determined by 
the Administrator, the Administrator may effectuate the capture of the escaped 
domestic cervidae to ensure the health of Idaho's livestock and wild cervidae 
populations. 
That is what the Rule says; that is what the Rule means; and what the defendants now wish it 
said and meant is of no moment. What matters is that timeliness is a particularly fact-dependent 
thing, as no less a light than the actual Administrator himself unequivocally testified. And 
absent an actual determination that an escaped animal has in fact been "infected, or affected with, 
or exposed to an animal health emergency disease," IDAPA 02.04.19.305.01, two immutable 
truths obtain: (1) The State has no authority to do anything unless "the owner is unable to 
retrieve escaped domestic cervidae in a timely manner, which is a determination that must be 
made by the Administrator based on the particular facts of the case and (2) Even if the facts of 
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the particular case lead the Administrator to make such a determination, the extent of what the 
State is authorized to do about it is very limited: the Administrator may effectuate capture of the 
escaped stock. Nowhere does any provision of the Idaho Code or the administrative rules 
authorize the State-sponsored destruction of escaped domestic elk simply for being "o"ut" -
regardless of the duration for which they have accordingly been rendered strays. Defendants 
admit: 
"The State has consistently taken the position in this case that the seven day 
period established in I.C. §25-3705A(3), and the administrative regulations 
adopted thereunder, is the reasonable period of time allowed for the recapture of 
escaped domestic elk before the State may act to take those animals without 
payment of compensation to the owner." 
Respondents' Brief at 19. That position, however, is simply wrong. 
4. The fact the Governor's office is authorized to issue executive orders 
does not mean the Governor can permissibly destroy private property, without 
just compensation of its owner, absent any authority for such destruction. 
Consistent with their complete failure to address the language of any of the statutes or 
administrative rules that apply to this case, defendants offer as an alternative the fact the law 
does provide for the issuance of executive orders: 
"In the State's initial memorandum that was submitted in support of its motion to 
dismiss the Rammells' original Complaint, the State declared the authority of the 
Governor to issue executive orders as authorized by Article IV, Section 5 of the 
Idaho Constitution, and by I.C. §67-802. (R., pg. 70). No issue has previously 
emerged in this case, as argued below, and no issue has been presented by the 
Rammells on this appeal, that has challenged the authority of the Governor to 
exercise his executive order authority to see that the laws are faitlifully executed. 
On this essential question, the Rammells and the State have diverged as to both 
the argument that the Rammells presented to the District Court below, and as to 
the argument that the Rammells have now presented to this Court on appeal." 
Respondents' Brief at 16, emphasis added. It is the "laws are faithfully executed" part that 
defendants can't get around. Nowhere have they addressed the language of the statutes and 
administrative rules that do apply, and nowhere have they cited any authority for killing stray 
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livestock, either, because there isn't any. The true "ipse dixit" - and baseless - nature of 
defendants' entire attempted justification for their slaughter of a stray livestock herd is seen in the 
following: 
"The exercise of the Governor's authority is derived [from] a number of sources, 
as indicated upon the face of the executive order itself. (R, pp. 32-33). Among 
other concerns, the Governor relied upon the need to protect Idaho's wildlife, the 
regulation and protection of domestic livestock interests, the protection of the 
general public welfare including interests Idaho shares in common with adjoining 
states and countries, the abatement of a public nuisance,2 in addition to the 
specific issues related to this particular escape." 
Respondents' Brief at 17, emphasis added. These claimed "concerns" might fairly encapsulate 
the concerns of Fish and Game and all of the various anti-elk ranching sportsmen's groups as 
defendant Huffaker testified (see Appellants' Opening Brief at 9-12, R., p. 419-422), and as the 
lower court expressed at the December 16, 2010, hearing, but they do nothing at all to obviate 
the efficacy of the Legislature's enactment of Title 25, Chapter 37 and Chapter 23 over and 
despite those concerns. 
If the defendants' argument were accepted by this Court in this case, it would empower 
the executive branch of the government to eviscerate the will of the legislative branch by the 
simple expedient of declaring itself "concerned" and signing an executive fiat. Elk are 
livestock, I.C. §25-3701, 3707. Cattle are livestock. When livestock get out, they become 
"Estrays," Title 25, Chapter 23. Notwithstanding the lower court's claimed personal expertise in 
things elk-y, the elected Idaho Legislature took special pains to ensure that everybody knew 
domestic elk were to be treated the same as cattle. Now, then: Suppose the animals that got out 
in this case were beef cattle, instead of domestic elk. And suppose further the governor issued 
2 This one isn't really even in the executive order. Its only existence in the case is in the lower 
court's footnote 7 (R., p. 114), which itself merely volunteered the unremarkable fact there is 
such a doctrine in the common law. Once so suggested, of course, the defendants then and only 
then followed that lead and began claiming it applied in the instant case. 
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the same executive order he did in this case (R., p. 000032-33), including the listing of all his 
claimed "concerns." And finally, suppose the "shooter teams," the helicopter and the airplane all 
did what they did here, and slaughtered as many of the rancher's cattle as they possibly could. 
Would the State be heard to claim, for justification, that the governor had listed the foregoing 
"concerns" as a sufficient substitute for legislative authority? 
Clearly not, and the only difference between that scenario and this one is that the former 
would have likely got the governor thrown out of office, instead of elected again - to an even 
more powerful one. 
5. The private individuals the State enlisted to help slaughter plaintiffs' livestock 
were not "licensed hunters" as the term is used in I.e. §25-3705A(3). 
A significant "tell" occurs in Respondents' Brief at 18: 
"In addition, nowhere in their appellate argument have the Rammells actually 
argued and established that any of their domestic elk was actually killed by 
anyone who was not a licensed Idaho hunter who was [ ] entitled to the 
immunity afforded by I.C. §25-3705A(3), or that the State and its agents were not 
entitled to the immunity provided by extension under this statute for such non-
compensated takings that were made by licensed hunters. " 
Respondents' Brief at 18, emphasis added. If the State-enlisted private party shooters were in 
fact "Joe Hunter" who while hunting wild elk hit one that was in fact a seven-day escaped 
domestic one, there would be no need for any "extension" to afford State immunity, because the 
statute specifically so provides. The "extension" the defendants need here is to extend the "Joe 
Hunter" provision to the people the State specifically authorized to go kill as many of plaintiffs 
animals as they possibly could (Executive Order, Paragraph 3 a - c, R. p. 000032-33), and that 
flies in the face of the unmistakable intent of the statutory scheme to condone and protect this 
relatively new and highly controversial industry. Moreover, defendants have admitted that such 
persons who were government employees were not the "licensed hunters" contemplated by I.e. 
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§25-3705A(3), from which it follows that neither were the private individuals the State 
specifically enlisted to help: 
REQUEST FOR ADMISSION NO. 71: Admit or deny that IDFG and/or ISDA 
employees, who were purportedly authorized by Executive Order 2006-32 to kill 
plaintiffs' elk, did not become "licensed hunters" under Idaho Code §25-3705A(3) 
by virtue of the Executive Order. 
RESPONSE TO REQUEST FOR ADMISSION NO. 71: 
Qualified admission. See Response to Request for Admission no. 72. 
REQUEST FOR ADMISSION NO. 72: Admit or deny that IDFG and/or ISDA 
employees, who were purportedly authorized by Executive Order 2006-32 to kill 
plaintiffs' elk, did not become "licensed hunters" under Idaho Code §25-3705A(3) 
by virtue of the "RULES" promulgated by the Idaho Fish and Game Commission, 
a copy of which rules are set forth in the document Bates Nos. PLF 02068-02070. 
RESPONSE TO REQUEST FOR ADMISSION NO. 72: 
Qualified admission. The terms and conditions of Executive Order no. 2006-32 
authorize Idaho Department of Fish and Game and the Idaho Department of 
Agriculture to "immediately identify and shoot on site any domestic elk that have 
escaped from the Conant Creek Facility .... " 
R., p. 342.3 The distinction between "Joe Hunter" and the State's operatives in the intentional 
destruction of plaintiffs' livestock is reflected in defendant Huffaker's deposition, too: 
3 The purported qualifications of these admissions should be ignored for the same reason evasive 
denials may be ignored because, like most ofthe defendants' attempts to avoid the intent of Rule 
36, I.R.C.P., they do not comply with the rule and thus may be deemed admissions,just as ifthe 
party failed to respond at all: 
Rule 36(a) provides that a matter may be deemed admitted if the answer "does not 
comply with the requirements of this rule." It is undisputed that failure to answer 
or object to a proper request for admission is itself an admission: the Rule itself so 
states. It is also clear that an evasive denial, one that does not "specifically deny 
the matter," or a response that does not set forth "in detail" the reasons why the 
answering party cannot truthfully admit or deny the matter, may be deemed an 
admission. See, e. g., Havenfield Corp. v. H & R Block, Inc., 67 F.R.D. 93, 96-97 
(W.D.Mo.1973). Since such a response does not comply with the literal 
requirements of Rule 36(a), the district court may, in its discretion, deem the 
matter admitted. 
Asea, Inc. v. Southern Pac. Transp. Co., 669 F.2d 1242, 12452 (9th Cir. Cal. 1981), emphasis 
added. See also, In re Katrina Canal Breach Litigation, 2007 WL 1959193, 1-2; Miller v. 
Holzmann, 240 F.R.D. 1,4 (D. D.C. 2006). Rule 36 can pare cases to the bone, if enforced. 
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46 
18 Q. Okay. So if! understand the chronology 
19 correctly, employees of your department commenced 
20 shooting the elk earlier, but then by the 19th you 
21 determined that you needed the assistance of private 
22 parties as well and so you enlisted the aid of the 
23 private hunters to --
24 A. That's correct. 
25 Q. -- conduct this depredation hunt? 
47 
1 A. Yep. 
2 MR. FUREY: Okay. 
3 (Exhibit 10 was marked for identification 
4 and a copy is attached hereto.) 
5 BY MR. FUREY: 
6 Q. Mr. Huffaker, Exhibit 10 is a single-page 
7 document dated October 12,2006 carrying Bates No. PLF 
8 02078, the salutation of which is "Dear Landowner," 
9 and it was apparently sent out by Steve Schmidt, 
10 regional supervisor. 
11 As I read this, it appears to me that it's 
12 simply an advisory by the regional supervisor of the 
13 Idaho Department ofFish and Game to either a private 
14 land owner or multiple private land owners explaining 
15 that the project is extended until October 31. 
16 Am I encapsulating it fairly and 
17 correctly? 
18 A. I believe so. The -- the way I remember 
19 this document is that the region recommended to me 
20 that we extend the hunt for the local land owners, 
21 who -- who still would be those most likely to be able 
22 to identify and take these domestic elk on -- on their 
23 property, so that's what we did. 
Huffaker depo., p. 46. L. 18 - p. 47, L. 23, (R. p. 342). 
Nothing in I.e. §25-3705A was ever intended by the legislature or anyone else to apply 
to what the defendants did in this case. It was simply latched onto out of context and used as an 
excuse. 
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6. Defendant Risch could not have "reasonably but mistakenly" believed that his 
conduct did not violate plaintiffs' clearly established property rights. 
With every page of defendants' brief, their position weakens, until at page 27 they nearly 
admit what plaintiffs have said all along, i.e., the defendants' acts violated the plaintiffs' clearly 
established rights in and to their livestock: 
"Ultimately, the question in respect to qualified immunity under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, 
as the District Court correct[ly]stated, is not whether the official did or did not 
actually violate clearly established law. (R., p. 119 Miller v.Idaho State Patrol, 
150 Idaho 856, 869, 252 P.3rd 1274, 1287 (2011) ("[t]he qualified immunity 
standard 'gives ample room for mistaken judgments' by protecting 'all but the 
plainly incompetent or those who knowingly violate the law[4].'" quoting from, 
Hunter v. Bryant, 502 U.S. 224, 229, 112 S.Ct. 534,537, 116 L.Ed.2d 589, 
596(1991) and Malley v. Briggs, 475 U.S. 335, 341-43, 106 S.Ct. 1092, 1096-97, 
89 L.Ed.2d 271, 278-79 (1986). 
There are no prior Idaho appellate cases that have construed and applied 
I.C. § 25-3705A. When the law remains undeveloped, or the applicable principles 
are too uncertain, then an official should be granted immunity if he could have 
reasonably, but mistakenly, believed that his conduct did not violate the right. 
Miller v. Idaho State Patrol, 150 Idaho 856,869,252 P.3rd 1274, 1287 (2011)." 
Respondents' Brief at 28. 
If defendants' acts were immunized by I.C. § 25-3705A, as the lower court found after it 
flip-flopped from 
"Finally, even the language of I.e. §25-3705A itself appears to indicate an 
intention to insulate licensed hunters, and the state agencies who licensed those 
hunters, from liability for inadvertently killing and taking domestic cervidae that 
have escaped for more than seven (7) days * * * 
(R., p. 114, emphasis added) to "I do agree with [plaintiffs] counsel, it's not ambiguous, but I 
think his interpretation isjustflat wrong," (December 16,2010, Tr., p. 46, L. 18 -20), then (a) 
they'd be highly motivated by self-interest to actually quote and discuss that language - which 
they haven't done, anywhere in their entire brief, and (b) they'd have no motivation to rely as 
4 Precisely as plaintiffs maintain occurred here. 
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heavily as they do on the "reasonable but mistaken" excuse that affords the claimed basis for 
their "qualified immunity" defense. 
The reality is that no one could genuinely read I.C. § 25-3705A(3) and the related 
administrative rules as authorizing what the defendants did here, which in turn explains' why 
nowhere in their brief have defendants actually set forth the text of the statute and the rules and 
tried to explain how they could possibly be wrenched into something that would help them 
escape liability for their actions. 
Finally, even if there were any headspace for a "reasonable but mistaken" take on the 
import of I.C. § 25-3705A(3), the claimed reasonableness of that take would present a question 
of fact for the jury - not for the lower court on a motion by the State and U.S. Senator Risch for 
summary judgment. Jackson v. City of Pittsburg, 2010 WL 2347085 at 6-7 (2010). 
7. Attorney fees. 
As discussed in appellants' opening brief, it is apparent that defendants' claim for attorney 
fees, like their counterclaim for the cost of the destruction of plaintiffs' livestock, was urged for 
no greater purpose than to create a bargaining chip with which to dissuade plaintiff from 
challenging what occurred below. It didn't work, even though the lower court did give them 
about half of what they asked for. 
The claim that plaintiffs have brought this case "without basis in law or fact" is specious. 
The law is the Fifth Amendment to the constitution's prohibition of governmental taking of 
private property without due process and without just compensation, together with an actual 
examination of the language of the applicable statutes and administrative rules, which discloses 
that the defendants' reliance upon them as purported justification for the intentional destruction 
of plaintiffs' property was a sham. The facts are that the defendants intentionally destroyed 
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plaintiffs' property without due process and without the payment of just compensation. The 
award of attorney fees was plain error. 
8. Reassignment on remand. 
Plaintiffs recogruze that if they prevail in this appeal, they will have the right to 
disqualify former fish and game attorney, now judge, Copsey on remand. However, the 
enormity of the error committed here - by a trial court that should have recused itself sua sponte 
once it realized how antithetical its own firmly held views were to one of the "sides" in the case-
warrants comment and deterrence by this Court. 
Defendants point out plaintiffs did not move to disqualify the lower court in those 
proceedings, which is true. But until the court conducted the December 16, 2010, hearing as it 
did (transcript appended), it could not be known just how firmly devoted to its personally held 
views that court really was. Roger Fuhrman, Fish and Game's P.R. chief, couldn't have argued 
the case for defendants more forcefully. 
Conclusion. 
It is submitted that never in a million years would then-governor (now U.S. Senator) 
Risch have ordered the summary destruction of state senator Jeff Siddoway's elk herd had it 
been those that became strays for a few weeks instead of plaintiff's. Indeed, never before in the 
history of the program had any strays been destroyed by the State, and the occasional escape was 
neither uncommon nor unexpected - in other words, they sometimes got out, just like beef 
livestock do. 
The reality here, though, is that whereas elk ranching generally is an easy target with Fish 
and Game and the huge sportsman voter bloc, the particular ownership of these animals must 
have made them especially so. It's no stretch to imagine early reports in the governor's office: 
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"There's over a hundred domestic elk out and they're probably X's!" "Whose?!" "X's!!" "You 
gotta be kiddin' me. That's just too perfect." 
While the lower court on December 16, 2010, made an emphatic point that "there is 
absolutely zero5 evidence of any malicious intent or any attempt to retaliate or any of the other 
things that were in some of those affidavits," December 16, 2010 Tr., P. 55, L. 25-P. 52, L. 3 
(attached as Appendix), the natural, indisputable fact - established without qualification by the 
sworn testimony of both the Administrator of the Department of Agriculture, Dr. Greg Ledbetter, 
and the Director of the Department of Fish and Game, Steve Huffaker - is that there was a very 
real, very significant institutional prejudice against elk ranching at Fish and Game and among the 
hunting public. It was those factions the governor consulted, to the exclusion of the Department 
of Agriculture - notwithstanding the entire program had been transferred/rom Fish and Game to 
the Department of Agriculture. 
The fishers and the hunters had made their calls for the actual elimination of elk ranching 
"loud and clear" to the Department of Fish and Game. When the plantiffs' livestock got out, the 
roar of the crowd would certainly cheer the governor for blowing them off the map. After all, 
what better way to put an especially noisy one of these outfits out of business than by killing its 
livestock and then refusing reimbursement? 
But it was illegal. ~ 
Respectfully submitted this \0 day of November, 2011. 
5 Holding thumb to forefinger for effect. 
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1 taking, not the state. However, they expanded the 1 Mr. Runft's argument, the trigger here is not 
2 liability base for the hunter in doing that so as 2 infection of livestock. It's not contagious -- a 
3 to include the state so that if a hunter did that, 3 contagious disease of livestock. It's the escape. 
4 the state wouldn't get sued. 4 There's specific statutes that we've 
5 So we believe that was the 5 discussed all day regarding domestic cervidae. 
6 inappropriate statutory -- or the improper use of 6 There is a whole other section, a whole other 
7 a statutory base to allow the governor to proceed. 7 statutory scheme regarding livestock. Cervidae 
8 Thank you. 8 are defined -- domestic cervidae are defined. And 
9 THE COURT: Thank you very much. Mr. Kelly, 9 what we have is an elk ranch and elk are domestic 
10 any brief response? 10 cervidae. And under the statutes we've discussed 
11 MS. KELLY: Just briefly, Your Honor. 11 today under Title 25, Chapter 37, domestic 
12 I think -- for the purpose of this 12 cervidae can be taken and they can be taken by 
13 motion again, Your Honor, I think the facts as set 13 hunters. And I believe that provides the immunity 
14 out in the complaint are all we need to hear in 14 that should be awarded to the state in the matter 
15 this matter. What Mr. Runft gave you, while maybe 15 under the statutory scheme. 
16 interesting, has no bearing on this matter. It's 16 And I don't think -- again, in regard 
17 not Idaho information. It's got nothing to do 17 to either the executive or qualified immunity or 
18 with Idaho. It's Montana information related 18 the discretionary immunity, those are ancillary 
19 presumably to Montana statute. So I don't think 19 arguments which I think equally apply to the 
20 that really expands this out past a 12(b)(6) 20 individuals in this matter. Thank you. 
21 motion. 21 THE COURT: Thank you. I appreciate the 
22 So I think everything we presented in 22 fine work that both counsel have done. It's an 
23 our briefs is all the court needs to rule on these 23 area that I'm very interested in and have been for 
24 motions. 24 years. I really enjoy fish and game law. I think 
25 And to specifically address some of 25 it's fascinating. I also like dealing with fish 
23 24 
1 and game people because they're interesting 1 BOISE, IDAHO, DECEMBER 16, 2010 
2 people. 2 
3 I'm going to take this under 3 THE COURT: All right. I want everyone to 
4 advisement. I think it's -- it's a unique case. 4 know that I have read all of the material and in 
5 So I'm going to take it under advisement and issue 5 fact went back and read all of the motions that 
6 a written decision. It may take a couple of 6 have been filed. I've read everything in the file 
7 weeks, if that's okay with the parties. And I 7 again and I will be able to rule from the bench 
8 want to thank you very much for your participation 8 when we're finished today. 
9 today. Thank you very much. 9 Each side gets a total of 15 minutes. 
10 MR. KELLY: Thank you, Your Honor. 10 I've read your material. So don't repeat what's 
11 MR. RUNFT: Thank you. 11 in there unless there's something you want to 
12 12 emphasize. Sorry. I ran down the hall. 
13 13 So if you want to go ahead, it is your 
14 14 motion. You may proceed, counsel. 
15 15 MR. KELLY: Thank you, Your Honor. Your 
16 16 Honor, as the court and Mr. Furey are aware, we're 
17 17 moving for summary judgment today on the 
18 18 plaintiff's first amended complaint. 
19 19 Subsequent to filing the motion, the 
20 20 court asked the parties to address three 
21 21 additional issues -- or three specific issues. 
22 22 One being whether the -- Counts Six and Seven, the 
23 23 emotional distress claims filed under 1983 are 
24 24 tort claims, whether the statute at issue, 
25 25 25-370SA is constitutional; and whether the 1983 
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1 claims can actually withstand summary judgment on 1 and went to the doctor because they didn't get a 
2 an objective standard basis, is my understanding 2 hearing before the elk were destroyed. That's the 
3 of the issues and how the court had framed them. 3 best example I could come up with. 
4 Simply, Your Honor, I'll address those 4 In that regard because the facts don't 
5 three issues as quickly as possible. Essentially 5 fit that situation, I don't believe it's -- we 
6 in regard to Counts Six and Seven, it's the 6 don't believe it's a 1983 claim. And, in essence, 
7 defendant's position that those claims are not 7 because they are then tort claims, we believe that 
8 1983 claims. They could be, but they're not. We 8 those two claims fall under the same discretionary 
9 -- we cited a case, Carey v. Piphus, which there 9 function exemptions -- exceptions that the tort 
10 is a narrow opening there where emotional tort -- 10 claims from the first complaint fell under. 
11 emotional distress claim can be a 1983 claim. 11 THE COURT: Well, I don't think you even 
12 THE COURT: It still has to stem from a 12 have to go that far. You simply cannot as a 
13 constitutional violation. 13 matter of a 1983 claim make it based on a tort. 
14 MR. KELLY: Right. 14 MR. KELLY: Well, I'm giving all of the 
15 THE COURT: You certainly can get -- you can 15 alternatives, judge. 
16 get damages that could be emotional distress, but 16 THE COURT: Right. I mean, I don't want to 
17 they all still must stem from the violation 17 go start down the road now of starting to look to 
18 itself. 18 see whether it fits within the Tort Claims Act. 
19 MR. KELLY: Correct, Your Honor. And that's 19 They specifically did not allege a tort claim 
20 where I was kind of going with this. I mean, the 20 under the Tort Claims Act. 
21 only thing I did was come up with an example as to 21 MR. KELLY: Correct. I'm just saying that 
22 how this would fit in and why it doesn't here. 22 as -- if we take it one step further. Again, I 
23 Your Honor, I think -- essentially in 23 think the cases that the court cited to the 
24 this instance I think the plaintiffs would have to 24 parties, Baker v. McCall and Estelle v. Gamble, 
25 allege that they were distraught and got headaches 25 fit right in on all fours with the situation we 
27 28 
1 have here. 1 know, that was kind of my next step, that, you 
2 In regard to Counts One and Two and 2 know, the state has the right and the obligation 
3 whether they're constitutional, I think quite 3 to protect the citizenry, the wildlife, and 
4 honestly, judge, in the plaintiff's briefing they 4 basically just the overall public welfare 
5 actually conceded that the statute is 5 interest. And that in and of itself makes it 
6 constitutional. I think their -- the plaintiffs 6 constitutional. 
7 take on this was whether actually we -- the state 7 In that regard the governor's issuance 
8 had authority to act under that statute. 8 of the order in essence makes the ultimate 
9 Nevertheless looking at the 9 destruction of the plaintiffs' elk either not a 
10 constitutionality issue, the Idaho constitution 10 taking at all or a legal taking, and thereby 
11 provides the state with the police power to 11 they're not entitled to compensation. 
12 regulate its statutes. In this case it provides 12 And then finally, judge, my CliffsNotes 
13 the state with police power with respect to 13 version of all of this, Counts Two -- excuse me, 
14 livestock. 14 Three, Four and Five on the -- the remaining 1983 
15 THE COURT: Well, doesn't it also, counsel, 15 claims, I don't think there's anything different 
16 whether you go under the livestock provision or 16 in the first amended complaint than what was 
17 whether you go under the provision they have the 17 alleged in the original complaint in this matter. 
18 right to protect on behalf of all the citizenry 18 There's a couple of new facts with 
19 the wildlife which is owned essentially by the 19 twists put in there; one being a subjective 
20 state, either one gives them authority to pass 20 allegation that there was a retaliatory motive. 
21 regulations to protect that wildlife? 21 You know, I think we addressed that, judge, in our 
22 MR. KELLY: Oh, absolutely, judge. 22 original briefing that even if there's a 
23 Absolutely. That's the -- again, I'm just trying 23 subjective standard, which under Harlow there's 
24 to layout as much as I can as far as foundation 24 not anymore, the plaintiff's own statement would 
25 for that support that is constitutional. And, you 25 indicate they didn't know Governor Risch ahead of 
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time, they didn't know Mr. Huffaker ahead of time. 
Thereby there really is no retaliatory motive 
involved. Anyway -- but regardless it doesn't --
it doesn't apply. 
And under the same objective standard 
that was addressed the first time around with the 
court, I believe that these three claims again 
should be barred under the qualified immunity 
provided to these -- these players. 
And this -- as an aside, I know this 
was addressed the first time around by the court, 
but in looking over the complaint, the first 
amended complaint, I'm still not sure what the 
allegations are against Mr. Huffaker other than 
the fact that he carried out the order by Governor 
Risch. Nevertheless he should likewise be 
dismissed from this action. 
Other than that, judge, unless you have 
any questions, I don't have any further comments. 
THE COURT: No. 
MR. KELLY: Thank you. 
THE COURT: Mr. Furey; right? Mr. 
Mr. Furey. 
MR. FUREY: I'm sorry? 
THE COURT: Mr. Furey. 
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for longer than seven days, Your Honor, but with 
respect to the court's -- what the court 
ascertains the statute to read is what the court 
ascertains it to be. But for the protection of my 
record so I'm not met with having failed to make 
my client's position, I do differ with the court's 
interpretation because I think all -- all 3705A 
does is provide that the licensed hunter who takes 
a domestic elk in compliance with Title 36, which, 
of course, is the Fish & Game statutes, in other 
words, during the season, it simply cannot be 
found liable to the owner of the elk, nor for that 
matter can the agency, the Fish & Game or the 
state. 
I -- with all due prospect, Your Honor, 
I must differ that that statute simply does not 
provide that on the eighth day the state is 
authorized to kill the elk. The state is 
authorized to kill the elk under Rule 303 and Rule 
305 in the event there's an animal health 
emergency or in the event of exposure to or 
affectation, I guess, with disease. The state is 
likewise authored to dispose of this livestock 
under Title 25, Chapters Two, Three, Four and Six, 
which, of course, are the tuberculosis or the 
CVOC 08-20694 
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1 MR. FUREY: Furey. 
2 THE COURT: Furey. I apologize. 
3 MR. FUREY: Thank you. That's -- that's 
4 fine. 
5 Your Honor, with respect to the state's 
6 authority to enact regulations for the protection 
7 of both livestock and wildlife, certainly they do. 
8 But in this instance the protections that the 
9 legislature in its own wisdom and in the 
10 fulfillment of those powers committed to it has 
11 seen fit not to authorize the killing or 
12 destruction of the livestock simply for failing to 
13 remain within the confines of the --
14 THE COURT: On the contrary, that statute 
15 specifically says that they can. 
16 MR. FUREY: Which statute, Your Honor? 
17 THE COURT: That's the statute that I asked 
18 everyone to decide. 
19 MR. FUREY: 3705A? 
20 THE COURT: Yes, subsection (3). It 
21 authorizes it where the escape -- where the 
22 animals escaped for more than seven days. In this 
23 case they had escaped for a lot longer than seven 
24 days. 
25 MR. FUREY: Certainly they had been at large 
32 
1 bang's or brucellosis statutory provisions. 
2 But the only - the only provision 
3 pertinent to escape given the -- even the very 
4 titles of the rules are that if the administrator 
5 determines that the owner has failed to get them 
6 in -- recover them in a timely fashion, and it 
7 specifically says as determined by the 
8 administrator, then in that event the department 
9 of agriculture is authorized to effect the capture 
10 of the animals. Those are -- that is right in the 
11 actual verbatim regulation implementing 3705 by 
12 the agency that has been specifically entrusted 
13 with that bailiwick. 
14 I guess I'm repeating myself, but the 
15 seven-day provision is simply to give the domestic 
16 elk rancher a king's X for seven days if they get 
17 out during hunting season and then after that if 
18 he still hasn't gotten them back in, too bad 
19 because obviously the hunters who don't even 
20 resemble elk and wear nonetheless hunter orange so 
21 as to not be confused with game will undoubtedly 
22 shoot them. And that's really all in the rule 
23 3705A with the seven-day provision does. 
24 I think it's fundamental to this case 
25 to recognize something that Justice Kennedy had in 
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1 his concurrence in Crawford-El, the department of 1 that and that it simply can't stem from garden 
2 corrections, when -- he pointed out that 1983 2 variety cases that the court was kind enough to 
3 actions can illustrate the best of our legal order 3 bring to my attention when I first arrived in this 
4 and the worst of our legal order. And as it 4 case and I understand that. Although I do think, 
5 illustrates the best of our legal order, he 5 A, as the court indicated, they are nonetheless 
6 pointed out that it allows even prisoners to the 6 items of compensable damage. And moreover, B, I 
7 protection of the constitution and all of 7 think in this case one of the -- one of the 
8 government has to comply with it. 8 particular aspects of the impact that it had on 
9 Domestic elk ranching isn't a popular 9 the plaintiffs was the essentially totalitarian 
10 occupation. I understand the lack of popularity. 10 aspect of the deprivation of the opportunity to 
11 I don't like it myself, but I'm not the 11 say, no, wait a minute, this is my position on 
12 legislature and the legislature for reasons known 12 this before summarily exterminating them. 
13 to it made Idaho one of a tiny handful of states 13 And I think all of the cases that I've 
14 that specifically went out of its way to authorize 14 seen so far are consistent with the fact that 
15 this as an agricultural pursuit and to make sure 15 absent disease or at least a reasonable belief of 
16 everyone understood that if they get out, that 16 disease, the state simply -- no states are 
17 doesn't alter the fact that they are nonetheless 17 authorized to just go forth and destroy property. 
18 property and that the owner has absolute rights on 18 Every single case that the defendants have cited 
19 them at all. 19 where animals were found to constitute a public 
20 Again, there is -- there is simply no 20 nuisance and thus present a situation that could 
21 statute, no regulation that says on the eighth day 21 properly be constitutionally abated by the state 
22 the state can kill escaped domestic elk. There 22 involved disease, actual--
23 isn't one. 23 THE COURT: But you have to remember, 
24 With respect to the -- the emotional 24 counsel, that the domestic -- the domestic elk, 
25 distress claims, I recognize what the law is on 25 any cervidae, they are different from other 
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1 livestock in that they can mate with the wild 1 different because if it's legal and constitutional 
2 population. And the 9th Circuit as well as the 2 to outlaw an activity, then it's constitutional to 
3 Supreme Court has made it clear that a state has 3 put limitations on that activity. And because 
4 an interest in protecting the native wildlife on 4 these particular animals are different from other 
5 behalf of its citizens not just from diseases and 5 livestock, the state has a different interest in 
6 parasites, but also to maintain the genetic purity 6 protecting the native population. 
7 of the wildlife to protect the wildlife in 7 .MR. FUREY: I'm following and in agreement 
8 competition for forage and habitat. 8 so far, but where we -- where my position parts 
9 So that's the thing that you're 9 company with the court's analysis is that in 
10 forgetting, is that they are not like cattle. 10 Washington certainly they did declare - that the 
11 Cattle can go out and they're not going to mate 11 legislature did declare an outright ban, which, of 
12 with the elk. These elk, however, can. And the 12 course, was within its province and power. Idaho 
13 state has a legitimate interest in protecting the 13 on the other hand has done just the opposite. And 
14 native wildlife to maintain that genetic purity. 14 had Idaho chosen either to ban them outright or 
15 That's what makes it different. 15 out of a concern for, as you point out, the fact 
16 :MR. FUREY: All right. If I could respond 16 that these -- and I think it's conceded on all 
17 to that, Your Honor. With respect to the 9th 17 hands -- were genetically pure Rocky Mountain elk. 
18 Circuit case, which was Pacific Northwest Venison 18 THE COURT: That's not the point because 
19 Growers -- 19 you're -- that's a judgment after the fact. The 
20 THE COURT: Yes. 20 rationale behind the law is to insure that there 
21 :MR. FUREY: -- that case was decided on the 21 is continued genetic purity as well as to make 
22 fact that Washington unlike Idaho had specifically 22 sure there is no passing on certain genetic 
23 declared illegal the possession of elk. 23 defects. It is irrelevant that subsequent to the 
24 THE COURT: But it's really not -- actually 24 escape and subsequent to the destruction of some 
25 with due respect, counsel, it's really not any 25 of those animals, they were found to be pure. It 
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1 doesn't make any difference because that's not the 1 maintain it did not. I understand the court says 
2 purpose behind the statute. 2 they did. If they did, I think that would clearly 
3 MR. FUREY: And then to go ahead and make 3 be within the legislature'S province. But I don't 
4 the rest of my record, had Idaho determined that 4 read the statute that way. 
5 the threat of -- of genetic defected interbreeding 5 So there it is. Thank you, Your Honor. 
S between domestic elk and wild elk was not 6 THE COURT: Anything further, counsel? 
7 adequately protected by the big screen that exists 7 MR. KELLY: No, Your Honor. 
8 at the borders and all -- all of the regulatory 8 THE COURT: Do you have any response to --
9 provisions that are designed to prevent genetic 9 apparently his basic claim that he's making is the 
10 mutants from entering the state -- 10 statute is ambiguous. 
11 THE COURT: And just so you understand, 11 MR. FUREY: Not at all, Your Honor. 
12 counsel, it's not just genetic mutation. What it 12 THE COURT: Or does not say what the state 
13 is is that when you have a domesticated set of 13 says it says. 
14 animals, they inbreed -- or they can inbreed and 14 MR. FUREY: Thank you. 
15 that's where you get ultimately what they call 15 MR. KELLY: Well, just briefly, Your Honor. 
16 genetic drift. But the state is within its 16 I think, at least what I'm gleaning from the 
17 authority to require them to be penned and to 17 argument and from the briefing, that plaintiffs' 
18 provide for what would happen if they escape. 18 taken the position that the statute only provides 
19 MR. FUREY: And, again, to just continue 19 for accidental taking -- or incidental taking, 
20 with what I was saying, Your Honor, had Idal10 20 excuse me, and I don't think that, in fact, is 
21 determined that the big screen at the border was 21 true. Paragraph three discusses how there is a 
22 inadequate and they needed a second screen that 22 legal taking if the hunter complies with the rules 
23 was a black and white if they're on this side of 23 and the promulgations of the Idaho Fish and Garne 
24 the fence for more than seven days, they shall be 24 Department. 
25 destroyed, the legislature could have done so. I 25 Clearly fish and game promulgated the 
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1 specific rules on what -- how to follow this hunt 1 same. And I'm going to find that they enjoyed the 
2 regarding the Ran1mell elk which included the 2 qualified in1munity for their actions for basically 
3 ability to take multiple animals. So that in and 3 the same reasons that I set forth in my original 
4 of itself tells you it's not an incidental taking 4 decision. 
5 statute. 5 I agree with the defendant that the 
6 That's all I have to say on that, 6 test under Harlow versus Fitzgerald is an 
7 judge. Thank you. 7 objective one. I don't think anyone really argues 
8 THE COURT: All right. As I said, I did a 8 otherwise. 
9 lot of research in this. 9 What that means, therefore, is the 
10 I'm going to start in a little bit 10 subjective intent of the officials is irrelevant. 
11 different order than what the parties have 11 And the case law -- and that's -- Crawford-El that 
12 started, and that is that I'm going to talk first 12 both parties have talked about makes it clear that 
13 about the individual defendants, Risch and 13 a state official's motive is irrelevant to the 
14 Huffaker. And I'll note that the plaintiffs have 14 analysis. You look at it from an objective 
15 not sued the state on any 1983 claims because, in 15 standpoint. 
16 fact, they can't. 16 Therefore, unless the actions taken 
17 So they have sued both Risch and 17 violate clearly established law, the state 
18 Huffaker under -- and they have a number of 18 official's action are immunized. And in this case 
19 counts. I believe it's Counts Three, Four, Five, 19 I find that the reasonable person objectively 
20 Six and Seven. Those are all 1983 claims alleged 20 would have believed, regardless of whether it's 
21 against Risch and Huffaker. 21 true or not, that they had authority to go forward 
22 Now, first as to Huffaker, I do want to 22 with the actions that were authorized by Governor 
23 as an aside say that I don't understand the 23 Risch. I don't find that there's any -- that they 
24 allegations against Huffaker, but it doesn't make 24 took any action that violated clearly established 
25 any difference because the analysis really is the 25 law. And, therefore, I'm going to grant Risch's 
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1 and Huffaker's motion. 1 against the state under 1983 and these aren't 
2 I do want to state as an aside -- but I 2 pursued under 1983. 
3 want to make it very clear that my decision does 3 The court also dismiss -- dismisses 
4 not rely on this, but as an aside, and this 4 Counts One and Two. And I want to kind of make it 
5 becomes important for another issue that we're 5 clear a couple things and this is the reason I 
6 going to talk about at the end, I note that 6 asked the parties to brief this. That while the 
7 contrary to the affidavits that were filed in 7 court denied the motion to dismiss originally --
8 support of amending the original complaint, it 8 on the original Counts One and Two which allege an 
9 does not appear to me that the Rammells have any, 9 unconstitutional taking, the court did nofrule on 
10 zero evidence, zero evidence of any ill motive or 10 the constitutionality of the actions or the 
11 any of these retaliations or all of the things 11 constitutionality of the statute in question or 
12 that were in their affidavit. 12 upon which the state relied, which is Idaho Code 
13 I only bring that up because 13 25-3705A(3). 
14 unfortunately you were not their attorney at the 14 And I did that because my understanding 
15 time, but I made it clear that if there was not a 15 of the briefings is that it was not really 
16 factual basis for those assertions, then I 16 addressed by the parties. And, therefore, I would 
17 intended to impose costs and fees. 17 note that a careful reading of the court's earlier 
18 Now, the court also dismisses -- and so 18 decision suggested clearly to the parties that the 
19 as to the 1983 actions against Risch and Huffaker, 19 constitutionality of the statute is what needed to 
20 they're dismissed. There's qualified immunity. 20 be addressed by the parties, which is what the 
21 The real issue then becomes Counts One 21 parties have now done. The court finds that it is 
22 and Two as to whether -- and in essence what's 22 constitutional, and, therefore, the state did not 
23 happening is that the Rammells are asserting what 23 violate the takings clause or due process clauses 
24 could be called I guess an inverse condemnation 24 of either the state or the federal constitution or 
25 claim b.ecause they don't have a claim for damage 25 of the eminent domain clause of the state 
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1 constitution. 1 in all instances. Therefore, the court finds that 
2 I generally incorporate the state's 2 the legislation can constitutionally carve out 
3 analysis, but more specifically I want to kind of 3 exceptions while -- and I find that that's what it 
4 explain a number of other things. I think the 4 did in enacting Idaho Code 25-3705(3). 
5 parties understand it's long been the rule that 5 I also find that the state of Idaho has 
6 private property can be destroyed without 6 an interest in protecting its native wildlife on 
7 compensation under the public nuisance doctrine 7 behalf of all of its citizens from diseases and 
8 where that property was diseased or where it is an 8 parasites, but in addition to maintaining the 
9 unreasonable -- makes an unreasonable interference 9 genetic purity of its wildlife, protecting its 
10 with a right common to the general public. 10 wildlife from competition for forage and habitat 
11 Therefore, while the legislature has 11 and insuring that the native wildlife will not be 
12 specifically decided to compensate certain farmers 12 captured or added to captive herds. And 
13 and ranchers including those that farm or ranch 13 vice-versa, that captive herds will not become 
14 domestic cervidae for the destruction of their 14 part of native wildlife. And both parties are 
15 animals destroyed because of certain identified 15 aware that that's the Pacific Northwest Venison 
16 diseases -- and they clearly have the authority to 16 Producers case, a 9th Circuit case, 1994. 
17 provide for that compensation if they wish. They 17 And as my conversation with counsel 
18 are not -- I want to make it clear, they're not 18 indicates, my feeling is if it's constitutional to 
19 required to. That's not constitutionally -- 19 preclude what could be a lawful enterprise based 
20 they're not required to where they destroy animals 20 on these interests, then clearly the state has the 
21 because of disease. But here in the state of 21 authority to regulate and determine what is 
22 Idaho they've carved out an exception. 22 compensable. I'm also relying on the Hughes 
23 Clearly the fact that the legislature 23 versus Oklahoma case at 441 U.S. 322. 
24 chose to provide compensation in one instance does 24 The fact that the legislature has 
25 not mean it is compelled to provide compensation 25 indicated that domestic cervidae are livestock for 
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1 some purposes does not mean that they are -- that 1 taking, then it wouldn't have a number of days 
2 they will be entitled to be treated equally in all 2 that they have to wait before they can issue this 
3 purposes -- for all purposes. As I indicated in 3 proclamation. 
4 my conversation with counsel, cervidae are 4 And it has to be done by proclamation 
5 different from other livestock. They, unlike 5 because it says taken by a licensed hunter in a 
6 ca ttle or swine or sheep or similar animals, can 6 manner which complies with Title 36. In other 
7 mate with native wildlife potentially affecting 7 words, they have to comply with the requirement 
8 the genetic purity of the native wildlife and 8 that they have a license and all of the things 
9 making their regulations unique and different from 9 that are required and the rules and proclamations, 
10 other livestock in some -- in some instances. 10 proclamations of the Idaho fish and game 
11 That is why is the legislature's action 11 commissioner -- commission and if they do take, it 
12 in allowing fish and game and the state to provide 12 is considered a legal taking. It immunizes not 
13 for, and I believe that this statute clearly 13 just the hunter, but it also immunizes the state 
14 allows them to provide for, a manner in which the 14 agency and the state which suggests that it is to 
15 animals can be destroyed because if they're 15 immunize them from an imminent domain argument. 
16 hunted, they're destroyed. I don't think 16 That's the reason for it. It makes no sense to 
17 counsel's interpretation makes sense and the 17 have any other interpretation of the statute. I 
18 reason I don't think it makes sense is that it 18 don't think it's ambiguous. I do agree with 
19 requires -- in order for -- it's not the 19 counsel, it's not ambiguous, but I think his 
20 accidental taking. It's the purposeful taking. 20 interpretation is just flat wrong. 
21 And I say that because of the fact that fish and 21 And, like I said, it makes no sense 
22 game cannot authorize the taking of those animals 22 that if it's just to preclude accidental taking, 
23 until the domestic cervidae have been -- have 23 then you wouldn't need the seven days and you 
24 escaped the control of the owner for more than 24 wouldn't need the proclamation. They would just 
25 seven days. If it were just to cover accidental 25 have to be escaped. And they could say that. 
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1 They could have easily said if there's an 1 this statute, the reliance on the lack of disease 
2 accidental taking by a licensed hunter who was in 2 after the fact determination that the destroyed 
3 compliance with Title 36 of a domesticated -- a 3 elk were not diseased -- and this is the real 
4 domestic cervidae who has escaped regardless of 4 point. It's the escape that triggers the 
5 how long it is, then that -- they could certainly 5 allowance of the taking, not the disease. TI,ere 
6 do that. That's not what they did. 6 are already provisions that deal with disease. 
7 And they also -- this is 2004 when it 7 This is for a different purpose. 
8 was added, they also put duties on the owners and 8 And the -- like I pointed out with 
9 operators to take reasonable action to prevent 9 counsel, the reason for not allowing the escape is 
10 escape, to insure that their fences and gates are 10 not simply for disease. That may be one potential 
11 built and maintained to prevent escape and to 11 reason, but it is not the primary reason for 
12 notify the Division of Animal Industries upon 12 requiring these animals to be fenced and for the 
13 discovery and to take reasonable action to bring 13 owner to keep them under control. 
14 it under control. 14 I find that because the legislature --
15 In this case due process was -- was 15 legislative actions in passing 25-3705A and not --
16 clearly prOVided. There was notice given to the 16 and in not providing compensation are 
17 Rammells as to the escape. They were given an 17 constitutionally proper under the public nuisance 
18 opportunity to get the animals under control. 18 doctrine. The statute itself is constitutional 
19 They didn't get them under control. Almost-- 19 and it doesn't sound to me like the Rammells 
20 it's almost a month later before the proclamation 20 really argue that it's not constitutional. They 
21 was actually issued so that there could be legal 21 just argue about what it means. 
22 taking of the animals. 22 MR. FUREY: That's correct. 
23 Again, whether -- whether these animals 23 THE COURT: Okay. But I'm going to make a 
24 ultimately were found to be deceased is 24 finding that it is constitutional. And, 
25 irrelevant. It's irrelevant. The reliance on 25 therefore, the court is going to dismiss all cause 
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1 of action based on any takings claims, which would 1 provisions of Chapters Two, Three, Four and Six of 
2 be Counts One and Two. 2 Title 25 apply -- that apply to livestock, 
3 To the extent there are equal 3 investing animals, also apply here. That in and 
4 protection claims, I want to make a couple of 4 of itself does not mean that -- that the 
5 findings. I agree with the state's analysis. I 5 legislature is -- that the legislature -- I'm 
6 didn't really see much in the way of analysis from 6 sorry, that does not create some sort of equal 
7 the Rammells, but clearly to the extent equal 7 protection problem because they're not similarly 
8 protection applies, the analysis would -- the 8 situated. 
9 analysis would be through a rationale basis. 9 The court finds that this 
10 There's no reason for strict scrutiny. There's 10 classification is not -- the bottom line it's not 
11 nothing on the means test and the Rammells have 11 obviously ambiguously discriminatory, and, 
12 not established a basis for their claim. 12 therefore, the Rammells, to the extent they're 
13 As the state argued, the relevant 13 arguing equal protection claims, have utterly 
14 classification is actually domestic elk ranchers 14 failed to show an equal protection claim. And to 
15 whose animals have escaped. It's a very narrow 15 the extent there are any of those surviving in any 
16 classification. 16 of these counts, the court dismisses them. 
17 I'm not sure if the Rammells would be 17 As to -- although the court does not 
18 arguing this, but I do want to address this. To 18 have to reach this because -- since the court is 
19 the extent that anyone would suggest the relevant 19 siding with the state as to the 1983 actions as a 
20 class were all livestock -- and I get -- I get the 20 whole, I do want to observe that if you read the 
21 sense that that's kind of what the Rammells are 21 last two claims, Count -- let's see, Six and 
22 saying because they are relying on 25-3703, which 22 Seven, which are couched as 1983 claims, it is 
23 is a general statute, suggesting that for most 23 really clear that these really aren't 1983 claims, 
24 intents and purposes -- and they're really talking 24 however you want to massage it. They really are 
25 about -- if you notice, that statute says the 25 tort claims. And 1983 claims, while you can get 
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1 emotional distress damages, number one, it 1 malicious intent or any attempt to retaliate or 
2 wouldn't be -- it would not be couched in terms of 2 any of the other things that were in some of those 
3 negligent or intentional infliction of emotional 3 affidavits. 
4 distress. Those are tort claims. 4 So I'm dismissing this complaint, this 
5 But to the extent that if they were 5 second -- this first amended complaint with 
6 able to prove their 1983 claim and they had 6 prejudice. And I'm also going to entertain a 
7 emotional distress as a direct and proximate -- a 7 motion for cost and fees under -- I think it's 
8 direct cause of the violation of civil rights, 8 12-117. I made it clear when I granted the motion 
9 then they don't need separate counts because it 9 to amend that if there was no factual basis for 
10 would be subsumed into any damages that they were 10 the allegations, first -- I don't think there's 
11 eligible for getting. 11 any legal basis, but if there is no factual basis 
12 So those on their face do not survive. 12 for the amended complaint, that I would entertain 
13 And I've already told everybody what the case law 13 a 12-117 or even a Rule 1I. 
14 is, but it is very clear the due process clause is 14 And that's why I did not allow the 
15 not implicated by the negligent act by an official 15 parties the -- the parties' attorneys at that time 
16 causing unintended loss or injury to life, liberty 16 to withdraw until all parties had actually signed 
17 and property. It simply doesn't exist. 17 the pleadings under Rule 11 and that included both 
18 And, finally, because of the court's 18 the plaintiffs as well as their present counsel 
19 decision, we do not have to reach punitive 19 because I was very concerned by the allegations 
20 damages. First, because there are no 20 and made that clear to the parties. 
21 constitutional violations that I can see. But I 21 So I will entertain a motion for costs 
22 also do want to point out that while there are 22 and fees. Certainly the other side can present 
23 these allegations which were put into the amended 23 their arguments as to why I should not impose 
24 complaint based on the affidavits filed by the 24 costs and fees. I am dismissing -- and I would 
25 Rammells, there is absolutely zero evidence of any 25 ask counsel to prepare the appropriate judgment 
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1 entering judgment in favor of the defendant 1 THE COURT: I forgot about the counterclaim. 
2 dismissing this case. Make sure that you do not 2 MR. KELLY: It may be worthwhile for me to 
3 do just an order granting summary judgment, but 3 talk to counsel about how to work things out there 
4 that you have a separate judgment form. The 4 and then get back to the court as soon as possible 
5 Supreme Court's getting very, very picky about 5 on that. 
S that. And I don't -- not that I'm disagreeing 6 But as far as our -- our -- I know the 
7 with them. I'm just suggesting that we've had 7 judge had made reference at our last hearing 
8 several where people get their order granting 8 potentially moving the trial date anyway if any of 
9 summary judgment and then they don't present the 9 the actions still existed. So I don't know what 
10 court with an actual judgment and the time for 10 the court's feeling is on that if we just have the 
11 appeal doesn't start until that actually is 11 counterclaim left. 
12 entered. 12 THE COURT: Well, why -- why don't we do 
13 MR. KELLY: Thank you, judge, yes. 13 this. We can leave the trial on just for the 
14 THE COURT: Thank you. The issues are 14 purpose of everybody appearing on that day and you 
15 interesting and it did bring me back to my days as 15 let me know what you're going to do and we can 
1S a fish and game attorney and constitutional 16 change the trial date if we have to. Okay? 
17 attorney. Yes? 17 MR. KELLY: Fair enough. 
18 MR. KELLY: Judge, one other aspect, the 18 THE COURT: This case has been around for a 
19 state does have a counterclaim pending. 19 while. 
20 THE COURT: Oh, that's right. I forgot 20 MR. KELLY: Correct. Okay. 
21 about that. 21 THE COURT: It's making me look bad in front 
22 MR. KELLY: I don't know how you want to do 22 of the Supreme Court and I'm used to that, so 
23 that at this point in time. 23 that's okay. And I'm teasing. That's kind of a 
24 I -- if I may speak first as far as 24 joke. 
25 suggestions. 25 MR. KELLY: I hope the record reflects that 
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1 I laughed. 1 BOISE, IDAHO, lANUARY 6, 2011 
2 THE COURT: Yeah, everybody kind of laughed. 2 
3 But I would like to -- since -- 3 THE COURT: We're now on record to try to 
4 actually since the counterclaim -- like I said, I 4 determine what's going on. My understanding is 
5 forgot about the counterclaim. Since that hasn't 5 you're not abandoning your counterclaim. 
S been fully resolved, obviously you can't give me a 6 MR. KELLEY: That's correct, Your Honor. 
7 judgment form and you can't move for costs and 7 We've had -- Mr. Furey and I have had discussions 
8 fees yet. Okay? 8 since your ruling on the summary judgment motion 
9 MR. KELLY: Okay. 9 about a couple of different options. And I've 
10 THE COURT: But I'm signaling to the 10 also had meetings with the client, the state 
11 Rammells that I'm inclined to grant costs and fees 11 agency. At this stage they're not willing to give 
12 and they'll have to really explain to me why this 12 up their -- the counterclaim. 
13 is not a frivolous case. I mean, I heard the 13 THE COURT: I assume for the purposes --
14 arguments. I just -- at this point it appears to 14 since this is a jury trial, for the purposes of 
15 me to be frivolous, but more importantly there's 15 that that you have --and you'll be able to provide 
16 no basis in fact, which really bothers me. So-- 16 a legal basis for the claim. 
17 MR. KELLY: Okay. Judge, thank you. 17 MR. KELLEY: Again, Mr. Furey and I were 
18 THE COURT: Thank you. 18 just discussing it. It's a straight negligence 
19 MR. FUREY: Thank you, Your Honor. 19 claim, Your Honor. There is no statutory 
20 20 provision in regard to this. So it is a straight 
21 21 negligence claim. 
22 22 THE COURT: Your claim is that they were 
23 23 negligent? 
24 24 MR. KELLY: Correct. 
25 25 THE COURT: Okay. 
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1 MR. FUREY: Correct. 1 Are the parties going to be prepared to go on 
2 THE COURT: So how long is this going to 2 Monday or what do you want to do? 
3 take to try? 3 MR. KELLY: Judge, with the fact that we 
4 MR. KELLY: 1 think from my perspective, 4 haven't submitted any jury instructions and 
5 judge, 1 probably will have maybe five witnesses. 5 pre-trial briefing, I --I actually -- I was under 
6 You know, a day and a half from our perspective. 6 the impression that when we were here the last 
7 You know, again, not to speak out of 7 time -- or actually two times ago, that the court 
8 tum here, but 1 offered to Mr. Furey to waive the 8 implied that we probably wouldn't be going on 
9 jury trial. I don't think that's an option at 9 Monday, the 10th. So 1 am not prepared to go on 
10 this stage. I don't want to speak for him. 1 was 10 the 10th. 
11 trying to come up with some other way to expedite 11 THE COURT: Do you have your calendars here 
12 this and I thought maybe a bench trial would work, 12 so you can schedule this? 
13 potentially submitting this on the briefs or 13 MR. FUREY: I do Your Honor. 
14 something along those lines. 1 haven't thought 14 MR. KELLY: 1 have my unavailable dates, 
15 that one out. But 1 think with the jury trial 1 15 judge, yes. 
16 will probably need two days, day and a half -- day 16 THE COURT: Before we start down that path, 
17 and a half-- 17 I want to start with you. What months are you not 
18 THE COURT: This is 9:00 to 2:00. Okay. 18 available? 
19 Mr. Furey, how long are you going to need? 19 MR. KELLY: If we're looking at three days, 
20 MR. FUREY: Probably less than one full day. 20 judge, I could -- there's three days in March or 
21 THE COURT: Okay. When you say full, I'm 21 May. I could probably do it if we're looking at 
22 9:00 to 2:00. 22 short term. 
23 MR. FUREY: I understood. 23 THE COURT: That you could do it? 
24 THE COURT: All right. And this is -- right 24 MR. KELLY: Yes. 
25 now we are on schedule for 9:00 o'clock on Monday. 25 THE COURT: What are those dates? 
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1 MR. KELLY: The last two weeks, judge. 1 notification of the escape from the neighbor, 
2 THE COURT: Of March? 2 called my client, reported it to him and will 
3 MR. KELLY: That would be starting the week 3 testify as to the steps he took immediately upon 
4 of the 21st. 4 such notification. She will be material to 
5 THE COURT: What about you Mr. Furey? 5 whether my client was negligent in any particular 
6 MR. FUREY: My only unavailable dates are 6 way or not. 
7 this month, Your Honor, and 1 could be ready to 7 THE COURT: Well, 1 think -- as I understand 
8 try the case on Tuesday the 10th. The 8 the state's position, he was negligent in allowing 
9 instructions will be largely stock. As counsel 9 a hole to exist in the first place and she 
10 has conceded, they have no statutory authority for 10 certainly wouldn't have any testimony as to 
11 the counterclaim. It's a straight common law 11 that --
12 negligence claim. All I require to get ready are 12 MR. FUREY: Is the Court --
13 three things: One, I want verified signatures on 13 THE COURT: -- and whether -- pardon? 
14 my answers to interrogatories that 1 have been 14 MR. FUREY: The court's ruling I can't have 
15 trying to get since about October. Two, 1 want 15 her deposition? 
16 the deposition of Dr. Lawrence that we scheduled 16 THE COURT: No. I'm just trying to figure 
17 back in, I believe, September. I have been trying 17 out what relevancy her deposition is going to 
18 to get it ever since. 18 have. 
19 THE COURT: Who is Dr. Lawrence? 19 I'll tell you, Mr. Furey, I'm kind of 
20 MR. FUREY: She was the assistant director 20 concerned about increasing costs, because, as I 
21 or administrator of the Division of Animal 21 told -- as 1 told you, there's a strong 
22 Industries. 22 possibility that I would grant the state their 
23 THE COURT: What relevance is her deposition 23 attorney's fees and at this point they're not 
24 to the counter claims? 24 insubstantial. 1 can only guess. 
25 MR. FUREY: She is the one who received the 25 So 1 don't know that -- I'm just trying 
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1 to figure out how all of this is going to get paid 
2 for. 
3 MR. FUREY: I believe the court has reviewed 
4 the depositions that have been taken so far. And 
5 I know it usually takes me about 45 minutes to do 
6 a deposition. 
7 THE COURT: Well, that may be, but to be 
8 honest with you, most of the -- in my view, most 
9 of the depositions are irrelevant to the issues in 
10 this case. 
11 MR. FUREY: I understand that. 
12 THE COURT: Because they all go to whether 
13 there was disease and those kinds of things and 
14 that's irrelevant. 
15 But in any event what I'm looking at 
16 right now is March 21st. 
17 MR. FUREY: Excuse me, Your Honor. If I 
18 could finish my record. The third thing I need is 
19 I would like a ruling on the --
20 THE COURT: Well, you've never filed a 
21 motion to compel, so I don't -- I do not assume 
22 that you're here to argue a motion to compel 
23 because that sounds like what you are arguing. 
24 MR. FUREY: The third thing is a ruling on 
25 the privileged claims for the documents that have 
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1 MR. KELLY: Not from the state's standpoint, 
2 Your Honor. 
3 THE COURT: Mr. Furey, is there anything we 
4 need to schedule today besides that? 
5 MR. FUREY: No, Your Honor. 
6 THE COURT: All right. Then we'll stand in 





















1 been withheld from us. Thank you. 
2 THE COURT: Well, until you file a motion, 
3 Mr. Furey, I'm not going to hear argument on it. 
4 And there's been no motion filed. Unless the 
5 state wants to argue it today. 
6 MR. KELLY: No. 
7 THE COURT: And they're willing to waive the 
8 notice requirements. Is the state willing to do 
9 that? 
10 MR. KELLY: No, Your Honor. 
11 THE COURT: All right. Shall we reschedule 
12 this for March 21st, three days? 
13 MR. KELLY: That works for me, judge. 
14 THE COURT: Mr. Furey, I'm not -- I'm not 
15 precluding you from filing a motion, but in my 
16 view you've got to file a motion. 
17 MR. FUREY: Understood. 
18 THE COURT: All right. So we'll set this 
19 for March 21st at 9:00 o'clock, a three-day jury 
20 trial. And I would like to have a pre-trial 
21 conference so that you can provide the jury 
22 instructions and list of witnesses to March 10th 
23 at 4:30. So that's March 10th at 4:30. 
24 Is there anything else we need to 
25 schedule today? 
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